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Abstract. This article describes how social constructs can deleteriously affect the implementation of 
intelligence and policy programs in environments of political destabilization. 
 
The New York Times--citing Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights--has reported that close 
to 1200 people died in Jakarta during rioting that occurred from May 12-15, 1998. The Times also 
reported that blame for the violence was attributed to unidentified, organized groups and that theories 
about these groups include attributions about thugs, representatives of radical organizations, and 
provocateurs from some branch of the Government's security forces. 
 
Thugs, radicals, and security provocateurs are but three of many social constructs that can be ascribed 
to the self and to others. Each has varying combinations of denotations and connotations. Each may be 
ascribed with varying degrees of compliance to prescribed denotations and connotations. And the 
identification of any as a causal factor in violence may drive decisions about intelligence analysis and 
operations, as well as policy development and implementation. 
 
The import of social constructs also can be illustrated by recent events in Colombia. Various acts of 
violence can be ascribed to the police, the military, the paramilitary, leftists insurgents, drug traffickers, 
and so on. Again, identification of any as a causal factor in violence may generate intelligence and policy 
consequences--here in attempts to stabilize the Government. 
 
Unfortunately, there are at least several problems in creating and choosing social constructs. (1) The 
meaning of social constructs are just that--socially constructed and ever-changing. This construction 
includes the something to be defined and the expression through which it is defined. For example, as 
with drug trafficking, one attempts to push in at one point and succeeds at inducing a push-out at 
another point. Unlike trafficking, but still relevant to social construction, the very target may change or 
disappear as one begins to attempt to push in. (2) There often is significant intra- and inter-observer 
heterogeneity concerning social constructs. In essence, each observer deals with the ever-changing 
nature of social constructs in different ways. And so the canard that one man's terrorist is another man's 
freedom fighter--even if someone may be both, one, or neither. (3) Characteristics of various political 
actors may be subsumed by more than one construct. One can be a thug and a provocateur, or a drug 
trafficker and military officer and leftist insurgent. (4) Social constructs create subjugating discourses 
that constrain more valuable perceptual possibilities. One or more constructs--once in common parlance 
and constituting dialogue--impede the search for other possibilities even in the face of disconfirming 
information. As a result, there may not be anyone--or hardly anyone--who fits a construct without 
rigorous perceptual and interpretive effort. (5) Social constructs may be facilely applied to individuals 
and groups, but the latter do not fit the narrative. There may be thugs without thugs engaging in rioting. 
There may be paramilitary personnel without such personnel engaging in human rights violence. 
 
Certainly, Indonesia and Colombia are not the only salient cases. During the time of the Reagan 
administration, United States (U.S.) security authorities were planning to influence Iran's putative 
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"moderates." Instead, the social construct of "moderate" was successfully deconstructed by Iranian 
authorities along with U.S. foreign policy towards the Mideast. (See Flaskas, C. (1995). Postmodernism, 
constructionism, and the idea of reality. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 16, 143-
146; Greer, S. (1997). Nietzsche and social construction: Directions for a postmodern historiography. 
Theory and Psychology, 7, 83-100; Mydans, S. (June 4, 1998). Students demand Habibie's resignation. 
The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Sargent, R-M. (1997). Journal of Constructivist 
Psychology, 10, 75-96; Schemo, D.J., & Golden, T. (June 2, 1998). Bogota aid: To fight drugs or rebels? 
The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Wagner, W. (1996). Queries about social representation 
and construction. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 26, 95-120.) (Keywords: Colombia, 
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